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I. INTRODUCTION: WISDOM AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
Wisdom is something we all have reason to care about.  Indeed, many ancient and 
contemporary moral philosophers, whose goal is to seek well-reasoned answers to questions 
about how we ought to live, have concluded that wisdom is a central component of a well-
lived life.  This has led them to explore questions like:  Are there different kinds of wisdom?  
What kind of a state is wisdom?  Is wisdom a kind of knowledge or understanding, or is it a 
skill or a complex set of dispositions?  How does wisdom relate to other virtues (excellent 
traits)?   What kind(s) of reasoning, if any, do wise people engage in to decide what to do?  
What role do emotions and knowledge play in wisdom?  Can people actually develop 
wisdom?  If so, how?   Contemporary moral philosophers, sometimes building on or 
responding to the ancients, continue to examine answers to these questions.  In this chapter 
we’ll provide an overview of some of the most prominent answers and the arguments for 
them, focusing especially on contemporary work that bears on the interdisciplinary study of 
wisdom.   
The questions just mentioned are about the nature of wisdom.  Recent interest in 
wisdom from psychologists raises new questions about the appropriate methods for studying 
wisdom.1  Philosophy and empirical science are sometimes treated as adversaries.  Often, this 
is because their proper domains of inquiry are contested.  In some cases, methods and objects 
of inquiry that were once viewed as part of philosophy are now considered solely the purview 
                                                            
1 See, for instance, Ardelt (2003, 2004), Baltes and Staudinger (2000), Baltes et al.(1995), Bassett (2011), Bluck 
and Glück (2005), Sternberg (2004). 
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of science.  For instance, ancient Greek philosophers such as Thales, Epicurus, and Aristotle 
rejected mythological explanations of the world in favor of rationally defensible naturalistic 
explanations (Irwin 1989, 20).  These attempts at ‘natural philosophy’ were precursors to, and 
have been replaced by, contemporary empirical sciences like biology and physics.  This 
raises a question about wisdom: is it the proper object of empirical psychology, philosophy, 
or a combination of the two?  Contemporary moral philosophers have lately grappled with 
questions about whether and how empirical research is relevant to moral philosophy,2 and we 
will describe how this work bears on this (philosophical) question about methodologies for 
studying wisdom.  Although there is no consensus among philosophers about the proper 
method for studying wisdom, we will explain why many moral philosophers believe that a 
plausible account of wisdom requires combining the methods of both philosophy and 
empirical psychology.   
We will begin in section II with some preliminary clarifications that help us better 
understand the type of wisdom that will be our focus: practical wisdom.  Practical wisdom is 
a reliable understanding of how we ought to conduct ourselves, and we distinguish this from 
two other types of wisdom: wisdom as epistemic humility and theoretical wisdom.  Then, in 
section III, we will discuss the methodological question about wisdom and argue that because 
wisdom is an ideal (something we ought to strive for rather than merely a description of how 
things actually are), empirical science alone cannot give a plausible account of it.3  This will 
allow us to evaluate various methods used by psychologists and philosophers for studying 
wisdom and to suggest that a plausible method must combine empirical research and 
philosophical reasoning.  In section IV we will survey some prominent ancient and 
                                                            
2 For some representative works, see Berker (2009), Doris (2002), Greene (2002, 2003), Harman (1999), 
Haybron (2008), Tiberius (2013), Tiberius (2008).   
3 Philosophers would call “wisdom” a normative concept, because it evaluates or prescribes a way of being.  
Since “normative” has a different meaning in the social sciences, we will avoid the word here.   
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contemporary answers to questions about the nature and development of wisdom.  We will 
conclude in section V with some reflections on the prospects for interdisciplinary study of 
wisdom.   
 
II. PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS: THREE TYPES OF WISDOM 
Practical wisdom, which is an understanding of how one ought to live and conduct oneself, is 
the kind of wisdom that will be our focus.  To provide a basic starting definition of this type 
of wisdom, it will help to distinguish it from other types of wisdom that have been of interest 
to philosophers.   
 
The Epistemic Humility View of Wisdom 
Socrates, who is often seen as the founder of Western moral philosophy, had a view 
of wisdom that, though tied to idiosyncratic aspects of his life, merits some attention.  His 
life, which we can glimpse through the dialogues of his student Plato, was largely taken up 
with philosophical discussions about how we ought to live.  Instead of engaging in the 
activities expected of free men in Athens (politics, for example), Socrates engaged in 
philosophizing: He found people who claimed to be wise and subjected their views to rational 
scrutiny to see if they had the wisdom he sought.   
At his trial for corrupting the youth and denying the traditional gods, Socrates related 
the impetus for his inquiry: His friend Chaerephon asked the Oracle at Delphi whether 
anyone was wiser than Socrates. To Socrates’s puzzlement, the oracle answered in the 
negative.  Since he did not think he knew “anything worthwhile” (Apology 21d), Socrates 
concluded that the god Apollo, through the oracle, was proclaiming the value of knowing 
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what you don’t know (Apology 23b).  Socrates had a sort of “human wisdom” (Apology 20d) 
because he understood that he knew nothing about the most important things – “wisdom or 
truth or the best possible state of your soul” (Apology 29e-30a).   He thus interpreted the 
oracle’s proclamation as a divine order to practice philosophy to help others achieve the same 
sort of result: to go about Athens examining himself and others to see if they really did care 
for those most important things and if they really did have the wisdom they claimed to have.  
By questioning his interlocutors, he revealed they could not justify their own views about 
how one ought to live or what was good or virtuous and that they had not attained the 
goodness they claimed to have (Apology 29e).  Indeed, in Plato’s Hippias Major (304c-e) he 
emphasizes that he puts his own views to the same test.   
Wisdom was thus a central part of Socrates’ philosophical practice: he believed that 
by testing and examining himself and others he could promote one kind of wisdom (an 
awareness of his ignorance of the most important things) that would spur the pursuit of 
another kind of wisdom (a deep and articulate understanding of what’s good and virtuous).  
This practice inspired the devotion of various young men who sought to emulate him and – 
perhaps aided by his eccentricity, public satires of his character, and political conditions – led 
to his receiving the death sentence.   
Socrates’ account of his ‘human wisdom’ thus gives us what we could call the 
Epistemic Humility View of wisdom: wisdom is, on this view, an awareness of ignorance of 
the most important things, like the nature of a good and virtuous life.4  But, it would be hard 
to see how awareness of your lack of understanding would be valuable unless it pushed you 
to more effectively pursue that understanding.  If Jones, despite being aware of his ignorance 
of the most important things, cares not a whit for self-improvement or understanding what’s 
                                                            
4 “Epistemic” comes from the Greek word for knowledge episteme.  Epistemology is the philosophical study of 
the nature, grounds, and sources of knowledge. 
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important, this hardly seems to be the kind of valuable state that merits calling him wise 
(Ryan 2014).  Indeed, Socrates made it clear that his ‘human wisdom’ was valuable insofar as 
it motivated us to seek out another kind of wisdom: a deep understanding of the most 
important things.   
 
Practical vs. Theoretical Wisdom 
Examination of Socrates’ view thus gives us a plausible general conception of 
wisdom: wisdom is a deep and valuable understanding of the most important things in life.  
We can further narrow our target by following Aristotle in distinguishing between two types 
of wisdom: practical wisdom (phronesis) and theoretical wisdom (sophia) (NE, Bk VI, vii).5  
Aristotle states that one difference between the two is that that practical wisdom (unlike 
theoretical wisdom) “is about human concerns, about things open to deliberation” (NE 1141b 
10).  Although it can be challenging to interpret this claim in a way that provides a clear 
distinction between the two types of wisdom (Baehr 2012), we can start by suggesting that 
practical wisdom is understanding of how things ought to be (how we ought to live, and what 
is good and why), while theoretical wisdom is understanding of how the world and the 
creatures in it actually are.  On this view, the difference between practical and theoretical 
wisdom is in their objects: Practical wisdom is understanding of prescriptive truths or reasons 
(truths about how we ought to conduct ourselves, or reasons we ought to conduct ourselves in 
certain ways), while theoretical wisdom is understanding of descriptive truths (truths about 
how things actually are or tend to be).   
To see the difference, we can imagine cases in which a person has one type of 
wisdom but lacks another.  A polymath scientist may have a profound understanding of how 
                                                            
5 All quotations from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are from Aristotle (1999). 
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the universe came to be, the physical laws that govern it, and even a reliably predictive 
understanding of how people tend to be and behave.  This would perhaps qualify as 
theoretical wisdom, but without further argument it need not imply that the person 
understands how they ought to conduct themselves: Despite their deep understanding of the 
ways things (and people) work, they might still be foolish or vicious and have little grasp of 
what actually matters for living a good human life.  So, as we’ll explain in more detail in 
section III, having theoretical wisdom is not sufficient for having practical wisdom.   
Of course, knowing truths about how the world is will often be relevant for 
understanding how we ought to conduct ourselves.  For instance, acting well requires an 
accurate understanding of what we or others have done and our own or others’ intentions and 
feelings (Hursthouse 2006, 291).  So, a full grasp of how we ought to live will require a grasp 
of some descriptive facts, in combination with a grasp of prescriptive truths telling us which 
of those facts matter and what they imply about how we ought to live.  But, there are various 
descriptive facts (such the chemical laws governing plastic formation, general relativity 
theory, or the social structure of ancient Mesopotamia) that, in most cases, we need not grasp 
to live well.  So, having theoretical wisdom – a deep and comprehensive grasp of how the 
world is and works – is not necessary for practical wisdom. 
 Reflection on these cases provides us with a rough distinction between practical and 
theoretical wisdom, but it raises other questions about the relationship between the two.  For 
instance, does one type of wisdom have a more ultimate or final value than the other?  Is one 
type of wisdom aimed, in part at least, at achieving the other?  Aristotle argued that the best 
kind of life for a human being will be one of study aimed at theoretical wisdom and that 
practical wisdom will aim at achieving this (see NE Bk VI and X; Pakaluk 2005, chaps. 7, 
11).  The ancient Stoics viewed theoretical wisdom as necessary for practical wisdom, since 
they believed morality derived in some sense from natural laws describing human nature and 
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its place in the universe (Baltzly 2014, sec. 5).  There are a variety of other views one could 
take, but we’ll leave aside that discussion here, focusing instead on arguments about the 
nature and development of practical wisdom.  
It is also worth noting that we do sometimes use the word “wisdom” to refer to deep 
and valuable understanding in a specific domain.  For example, we might call a doctor wise 
who possesses medical wisdom even though he or she is quite foolish in personal life.  But as 
Aristotle notes in his Nicomachean Ethics (NE 1141a), the virtue of wisdom is usually 
thought to be more general than this: a person must have deep enough understanding about 
enough of the most important things to be called wise in general rather than merely in a 
particular area. This more general notion of practical wisdom, which we all have reason to 
care about, is the kind that will be our focus.     
 
III. METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT WISDOM 
 Our focus is on philosophical arguments that attempt to give well-reasoned answers to 
questions about practical wisdom (hereafter simply ‘wisdom’), which is the understanding 
that enables us to make reliably good decisions about how we ought to live and conduct 
ourselves.  What is practical wisdom like, and how will it manifest itself in real people?  How 
can we develop it?  It can be tempting to think that because wisdom is a type of 
understanding, it is therefore a psychological state and so can be studied with empirical 
methods alone.  Psychologists have well-established experimental and observational methods 
for investigating psychological traits and abilities.  Philosophy, some might think, is 
unnecessary here.  Can we say the same about wisdom: Are the methods of empirical 
psychology alone sufficient to give us a plausible account of wisdom?  
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 Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) provided an argument that many 
philosophers think gives us a negative answer to this question.  Hume’s insight was that 
conclusions how things ought to be do not follow from purely descriptive premises about 
how the world actually is.  More pithily: You cannot derive an ‘ought’ from any number of 
‘is’s.  By understanding Hume’s insight and how it applies to accounts of wisdom, we can see 
the problems faced by attempts to study wisdom by empirical methods unaided by 
philosophical reasoning.   
 
Hume’s insight 
 There are a variety of interpretations of Hume’s insight that an ‘ought’ doesn’t follow 
from an ‘is,’ but the basic idea can be put fairly simply by focusing on particular actions.6  
Consider a claim about an action you ought not to do, such as ‘you ought not drive while 
intoxicated.’  We might think that the truth of this claim is implied by, and can be settled by, 
empirical findings: driving while intoxicated puts others and oneself at increased risk of 
injury and/or death.  This would give us the following simple argument: 
1. Driving while intoxicated puts others and oneself at increased risk of injury 
and/or death. 
So, you ought not drive while intoxicated. 
 This argument is invalid: even if the premise is true, the conclusion could still be 
false.  The mere fact that drinking and driving actually has particular effects doesn’t logically 
entail anything about whether we ought to do it; in order to draw conclusions about what we 
                                                            
6 For Hume’s discussion of the point, see for instance his A Treatise of Human Nature BK III, Pt. I, Sec. II. 
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ought to do we would need to add a claim about which effects (if any) matter and ought or 
ought not be pursued.  For instance, we could make the argument valid by this addition: 
1. Driving while intoxicated puts others and oneself at increased risk of injury 
and/or death. 
2. You ought not put yourself and others at increased risk of injury and/or death. 
So, you ought not drive while intoxicated. 
This argument makes a valid inference – if the premises are true, then the conclusion has to 
be true, too.  However, the prescriptive conclusion is now no longer justified by purely 
empirical premises.  The empirical premise (1) is now supplemented by a prescriptive 
premise: premise (2), which makes a claim about what we ought or ought not do.  And, these 
points hold for all other similar arguments: a prescriptive conclusion about what we ought to 
do will not be implied by empirical premises alone, because those empirical premises will 
need to be supplemented by at least one prescriptive premise.  Put more simply, you’ll never 
validly infer an ‘ought’ conclusion unless you’ve got an ‘ought’ in at least one of the 
premises.7   
 Many moral philosophers think this shows that empirical research alone cannot settle 
questions about how we ought to conduct ourselves or about what’s good, bad, right or 
wrong.  For instance, even if empirical research were to show that hiding a regretted 
infidelity was more likely to lead to more happiness in marriages, that wouldn’t eliminate all 
the ethical questions you might have if you found yourself deciding whether to admit you’d 
made such a mistake: is it these consequences that matter or some others, or is there 
something other than consequences – such as principles – that we should attend to?  
                                                            
7 For more detailed discussion of the question of how science is and isn’t relevant to ethics and moral 
psychology, see Tiberius (2015). 
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Empirical research can tell us various things about the nature and consequences of our ways 
of being or behaving, but which of those things matter and why are not empirical questions.   
 
Hume’s insight applied to wisdom 
 This point applies not just to claims about what we ought to do, but also to claims 
about virtues such as wisdom, which are claims are about what kind of person we ought to be 
or how we ought to cultivate our character.  Wisdom is a prescriptive ideal in the sense that it 
is a state that we ought to cultivate or promote: By definition, it is worthwhile and we have 
reason to work towards achieving it.  So, even if we describe a particular state in detail using 
well-designed empirical studies, it would not count as a plausible view of wisdom (as an 
account of actual or genuine wisdom) unless we can argue that it is valuable in the way 
characteristic of wisdom.  And, the question of what makes something valuable in that way is 
not something that can be discovered empirically.  What makes a state or characteristic one 
we ought to pursue or one that fills the valuable role of wisdom is a philosophical question.  
Given that the answers to this question are many and contentious – and subject to 
disagreement between and within cultures, lay people, and experts – we will need more than 
empirical research to get good answers to our questions about wisdom.  
 Some might be tempted to reply that these disagreements about wisdom actually show 
that it is amenable to study using empirical methods alone.  The disagreements about what 
wisdom is, they might argue, imply there’s nothing over and above cultural attitudes that 
make something or someone wise; instead, whether you are actually wise depends solely on 
your culture’s attitudes.  On this view, which we can call the Simple Cultural Relativist View, 
what’s actually wise is determined by culture: What makes a person actually wise is whether 
they have the traits and characteristics that their culture views as wise.  Does genuine wisdom 
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involve impartial concern for both strangers and family, or does a wise person recognize 
special obligations to family and friends?  Is a wise person concerned with maintaining 
authoritarian hierarchies and rigid gender roles, or not?  Can a wise person articulate and 
justify their decisions, or are they made mostly intuitively?  The Simple Cultural Relativist 
View implies that what’s the case for you (what it actually takes for you to be wise) depends 
on what your culture says.  If this view were plausible, then we could use empirical methods 
alone (such as the methods of sociology and anthropology) to determine what wisdom is.     
 Is Simple Cultural Relativism plausible?  Not terribly, which may explain why it is 
not a widely held view amongst philosophers.  However, it furnishes a nice example of how 
philosophical arguments about prescriptive theories proceed, which is often by identifying 
and assessing the implications of the position and the arguments for it.   
Take first the argument (described above) for Simple Cultural Relativism.  The 
argument states that the existence of cultural disagreements about wisdom implies that there 
are no truths about wisdom independent of culture.  But this does not follow: The mere fact 
that people disagree about what’s the case in a subject doesn’t imply that what’s actually the 
case is determined by cultural attitudes (Rachels 1999, chap. 2).  For instance, disagreement 
about the causes of global warming doesn’t imply that our culture’s attitudes determine 
whether our view of the causes is correct or not, disagreement about the number of gods 
doesn’t imply that “there is one God” is true when uttered by someone from a monotheistic 
culture but false when uttered by someone from an atheistic culture; disagreement about 
whether spirits or germs are the cause of disease doesn’t imply that the actual etiology of 
disease depends on our attitudes, and so on.  The existence of disagreement by itself is no 
better reason to think that what’s actually wise depends on cultural attitudes than it is to think 
that truths about those other subjects depend on cultural attitudes.  (For a similar reason, we 
shouldn’t expect to identify what’s actually wise merely by looking for what cultures agree 
12 
 
upon.  If we look back far enough, there was significant agreement that women’s 
subordination and some forms of slavery and servitude were moral, but that doesn’t indicate 
that those practices were actually moral or wise.)   
These problems with the usual argument for Simple Cultural Relativism suggest that 
we don’t yet have reason to think the view is true; indeed, the view also has some implausible 
implications that suggest we should conclude it is false.8  The most troubling is that it implies 
that whatever your culture views as wise is therefore actually wise, even if your culture 
endorses Nazism, slavery, the denial of women’s suffrage, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism or 
strict adherence to an oppressive caste system.  It also implies that it makes no sense to 
criticize or praise your culture’s view of wisdom (because there is no standard other than 
cultural attitudes by which to judge such a view) and that there is no such thing as progress in 
a culture’s view of wisdom (because there is no standard by which to comparatively evaluate 
cultural attitudes at two different times).  Probably wisdom will require being sensitive to 
cultural attitudes at certain times and in certain ways, but there is good reason to be skeptical 
about the idea that cultural attitudes wholly determine what is wise.    
So, if we want to say that criticizing or praising a culture’s view of wisdom makes 
sense, or that being a sexist advocate of slavery who derogates presumed inferiors is not wise 
even if a whole culture were convinced otherwise, then we should reject Simple Cultural 
Relativism.9  More importantly, for our purposes, whether we should accept the idea that the 
definition is entirely relative to culture is a philosophical question, not a scientific one.  
                                                            
8 For more discussion of Cultural Relativism (also known as Metaethical Moral Relativism) and the objections 
to it, see Gowans (2016).  There are more sophisticated forms of relativism that may be able to avoid  the 
problems we’ve discussed.  See, for example, Harman (1975), Prinz (2007), and Wong (2006). 
9 The value relativism that is a component of the model of wisdom described in Baltes and Staudinger (2000) 
seems compatible with this point.   
13 
 
Moreover, as we’ll see, it is a philosophical question that has implications for the relevance 
of wisdom science to study of the virtue of wisdom.  
 
Summary of methodological lessons for studying wisdom 
Ideals like wisdom tell us how we ought to be and how we ought to conduct 
ourselves.  Perh naps there is a set of criteria that is empirically measurable that we could use 
to determine who has wisdom, what other characteristics correlate with wisdom, how wisdom 
can be developed, and so on.  Indeed, we should hope this is the case.  But we can’t 
determine empirically which set of criteria provides a reasonable, compelling, action-guiding, 
account of wisdom in the first place. 
It is important to note that this does not show that empirical research is irrelevant to 
the study of prescriptive concepts such as wisdom.  There are a number of ways that 
empirical research could be relevant to the study of wisdom.10  For instance, many 
philosophers who defend an Aristotelian theory of ethics (which we’ll discuss in section IV) 
describe virtue as both attainable for humans and also composed of highly stable dispositions 
to act in the right ways and for the right reasons across a variety of situations.  But some 
moral philosophers have argued that research  in social psychology show these claims to be 
false: Human behavior seems highly influenced by situational factors, and this finding seems 
to undermine the claim that the highly stable dispositions supposed to constitute virtue and 
wisdom are ones we can actually acquire (Doris 2002; Harman 1999).  Whether this 
challenge to the particular views of virtue succeeds in undermining those views is a question 
still being discussed (Tiberius 2015, chap. 7).  Regardless, this example illustrates one way in 
                                                            
10 See Tiberius (2015, chap. 12). 
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which empirical research is clearly relevant to the study of normative concepts like wisdom: 
prescriptive accounts of virtues such as wisdom often make empirical assumptions.   
 
Implications for psychological methods for studying wisdom 
 These methodological lessons have important implications for the methods 
psychologists use to study wisdom.  In particular, they show that the two main methods – 
empirical study of implicit and explicit theories of wisdom – require significant 
interdisciplinary cooperation between philosophy and psychology if they are to succeed.   
We can distinguish between two main types of psychological theories of wisdom: 
explicit theories and implicit theories (Bluck & Glück 2005; Sternberg 1985).  While implicit 
theories are representations of what lay people view wisdom to be,11 explicit theories are 
“those that are constructed and tested by psychologists and other experts” (Bluck & Glück 
2005, 90).  The basic difference is that implicit theories aim to capture what lay people think 
wisdom is, while explicit theories operationalize wisdom based upon the views of experts 
(people trained to understand and evaluate a variety of historically important views of 
wisdom and related concepts) and then use empirical methods to see who manifests wisdom 
thus understood, what other traits or environmental features it correlates with, and what 
influences its development.   
To develop and study implicit theories (which we might also call folk theories or folk 
perceptions of wisdom), psychologists use various research designs (experimental and 
                                                            
11 Of course, it might be controversial who counts as an expert on wisdom.  We would want to figure out 
whether the expertise we’re looking for is expertise on what wisdom actually is or merely expertise in 
understanding and evaluating the views of wisdom that prominent thinkers have held.  If it’s the latter we’re 
looking for, then experts could be more easily identified.  If it’s the former, you might worry that wise people 
are the only experts on what wisdom actually is, and then we have the problem that we need to identify the 
wise before we can ask them what wisdom is. 
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otherwise) to find out what characteristics lay people view as wise, which particular 
individuals lay people nominate as wise, or the way people see wisdom operating in their 
own lives (Bluck & Glück 2005, 91–203).  Given what we’ve said about wisdom being an 
ideal, we should ask: what role, if any, do implicit theories have in providing us an account of 
what wisdom genuinely is?  The examples we gave above indicate that we should admit it is 
possible to have a mistaken view of what wisdom is: we should admit there is, in principle, a 
difference between what wisdom actually is and what it is perceived to be.  So: can implicit 
theories tell us about genuine wisdom?   
Psychologists Susan Bluck and Judith Glück argue that they can: 
The notion that an entire culture would carry around an organized construct of wisdom that is wrong, 
or incorrect, is a slightly bizarre one.  It suggests that human language and thought do not reflect 
reality.  Especially with a construct that in itself is defined by culture, rather than by a biological 
substrate, it seems odd to argue that what people in that culture think wisdom is could be entirely 
wrong.  One can certainly argue that there may be limitations to any single person’s concept of 
wisdom, or perhaps that it is difficult to truly know what wisdom is without being wise …  Still, an 
explicit theory of wisdom that was totally inconsistent with laypeople’s understanding of the term 
would be hard to defend.  There is an additional reason for accepting that implicit theories of wisdom 
reflect real wisdom: implicit and explicit, lay and expert definitions of wisdom converge in a basic 
sense on the same set of features as central in defining wisdom.  Thus, at least in terms of lay and 
expert definitions of wisdom, no strong dichotomy exists.  (2005, 90–91) 
One argument suggested in this passage for the claim that implicit theories of wisdom are 
reliable guides to actual wisdom is that implicit theories are unlikely to be “entirely wrong.”  
But this sets too low a bar.  Lay people’s views of physical laws may be unlikely to be 
entirely wrong, and a physical theory that was totally inconsistent with them would probably 
be hard to defend, but that doesn’t do much to show that physicists should start their research 
by surveying lay views.  Similarly, we need to show that implicit theories of wisdom are to 
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some significant degree reliable – that what the folk think is wise tends to actually be wise – 
if we’re going to include them in our method for inquiring about genuine wisdom.  And, it’s 
difficult to see how we could determine their reliability without already having an account of 
wisdom that we have independent reason to think is reliable.  Another argument that might be 
derived from the passage is that wisdom is defined by culture, but this is a view that, as we 
argued above, could not be the whole story about wisdom. 
Though we don’t accept these two strands of argument in the above passage, we do 
agree with Bluck and Glück that the folk understanding of wisdom is not a bad place to 
begin.  We think, however, that implicit views are in need of significant improvement even if 
they are somewhat reliable starting points for inquiry.  Wisdom is, by all accounts, a lofty 
ideal: Only a comparatively small number of people have achieved a significant amount of it.  
So, we should expect that both expert and lay people’s views about the nature of wisdom (not 
to mention their understanding of what matters in particular situations and why) to be 
incomplete, to have components that lack justification, and to contain some inconsistencies 
(Tiberius and Swartwood 2011).  If this is so, significant work would be required to make 
implicit theories into a rationally justifiable ideal worthy of being called genuine wisdom.   
The upshot of these arguments is that implicit theories of wisdom on their own will not 
provide us with a plausible account of wisdom.  At the very least, we need to subject the 
implicit theories to scrutiny to see if the elements in them are worth aspiring to and hang 
together in a consistent way.  In our work, we (Tiberius & Swartwood 2011) describe a 
method for doing just this.   On our view, we work toward a plausible view of wisdom by 
articulating the central elements of wisdom as identified in implicit theories, and then 
working back and forth between these elements and relevant empirical and philosophical 
theories (e.g. empirical theories of human decision-making and philosophical accounts of a 
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good life), revising and specifying them until we have a view that is action-guiding, rationally 
compelling, and empirically adequate (2011, 279–80).   
This provides a more indirect way in which implicit theories could be used to arrive at a 
plausible account of wisdom.  Instead of attempting to derive an account of what wisdom is 
directly from folk perceptions of wisdom, we could see those folk perceptions as starting 
material that we refine through reflection on its fit with other empirical and philosophical 
views we find compelling.  This method is thus a way of specifying Bluck and Glück’s 
suggestions that “an explicit theory of wisdom that was totally inconsistent with laypeople’s 
understanding of the term would be hard to defend” and that implicit theories of wisdom can 
be used to test explicit theories (2005, 91).   
The other main method contemporary psychologists use to study wisdom is developing 
and empirically testing explicit theories of wisdom: theories developed by “experts” such as 
psychologists or philosophers.  Given the methodological points from this section, it is clear 
that this method will only lead us to a plausible account of wisdom if the theory chosen and 
applied has a compelling philosophical rationale.  So, at the very least, there is reason for 
philosophers and psychologists to engage more directly with one another when developing 
and testing these theories.   
 
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF WISDOM 
Wisdom is thus an ideal that minimally can be described as the understanding of how one 
ought to conduct oneself.  But developing this general definition into an account that is 
practically useful and theoretically interesting requires answering a variety of additional 
questions:  What kind of state is wisdom?  What role does wisdom play in the moral life?  
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What are the components of wisdom?  How can wisdom be developed?  Here we’ll survey 
some prominent philosophical answers to these questions.   
 
Wisdom’s role in the moral life 
Describing wisdom as a type of understanding marks it out as an intellectual virtue: an 
excellence of mind.  But how should we characterize it?   
Philosophers who study virtue tend to argue that wisdom has a particularly central 
role in the moral life. For all philosophers who study virtue, virtue is central or necessary for 
human flourishing.  Some – Virtue Ethicists – even argue that we can define right action in 
terms of the virtues, of which wisdom is the most central.12 
To conduct ourselves well and to live well, we need to deal well with a variety of 
valuable ends of human action.  We have to understand when to tell others the truth, when 
and how to promote others’ well-being and how to balance it with our own, what respect 
requires, when being partial to a friend’s interests is important and when it’s not, how we 
should use humor in social situations, and so on.  Human life is filled with a variety of values, 
ends, and goals.  Virtue Ethics takes us to have a variety of character traits that can conflict 
with each other if they aren’t guided by wisdom.  In tough situations where the rest of us 
might see an impossible conflict between loyalty and honesty, for instance, the wise person 
grasps when honesty requires refusing to protect a friend’s secret.  And, choosing well 
doesn’t just mean exhibiting the correct external behavior: It also requires coordination of 
                                                            
12 This puts Virtue Ethics in competition with the two main alternative theories of what conduct is right or 
wrong and why:  Utilitarianism and Deontology.  We’re here describing one prominent version of the Virtue 
Ethical view defended, for example, by Hursthouse (1999), but there are various disputes and disagreements 
among Virtue Ethicists.  For an overview of some of the debates and differences, see Hursthouse and 
Pettigrove (2016).  For an accessible and historically sensitive comparison of ancient accounts of the nature 
and importance of wisdom, see Kamtekar (2013).    
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thoughts, feelings, motivations, and reasons for acting.  When your friend keeps you 
company after you have suffered an emotionally difficult loss, her conduct is more admirable 
(and more virtuous) when it is done out concern for your well-being than when it is done out 
of the desire to receive accolades.   
What we need to live well, then, is to be disposed to respond well to all of the reasons 
that confront us from the various things that are of value.  To do this we need character 
virtues like compassion, honesty, loyalty, self-respect, wittiness, and so on.  Each of the 
virtues can be described as a deep disposition to think, feel, behave, and be motivated in the 
right ways, at the right times, and for the right reasons in its particular domain (Aristotle 
1999, 1109a25; Rosalind Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2016).  For example, someone with the 
virtue of honesty is disposed to tell the truth at the right times, in the right ways, and for the 
right reasons: They know when sharing their unsolicited opinion is important and when it 
isn’t, when the pain caused by the hard truth matters and when it doesn’t, and so on. Instead 
of playing the fool for attention’s sake, humiliating others for social gain, or sitting stolidly 
when humor would bring the group together, someone with the virtue of wittiness  reliably 
useshumor in social situations at the right times, in the right ways, and for the right reasons.   
But, if honesty governs truth-telling and compassion governs threats to others’ well-
being, what happens when they conflict?  What happens when honesty seems to recommend 
telling your uncle the truth about his ridiculous hat, but compassion seems to recommend 
lying?  According to the Aristotelian Virtue Ethicists, these conflicts do not exist for the 
person with wisdom, because a wise person has a comprehensive grasp of what matters in 
situations that would befuddle the rest of us.   
Being a virtuous person – someone with all the character virtues, including wisdom – 
is thus a lofty goal that admits of degrees.  The wise person has an understanding of what the 
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particular character virtues require in particular situations.  But philosophers disagree about 
which character virtues are required for living a good human life.  Aristotelian accounts 
admit of many relevant virtues, including virtues (like wittiness) that might sound foreign to 
contemporary ears.  Ancient Chinese philosophers in the Confucian tradition (such as Kongzi 
and Mengzi) focus on a smaller catalog of virtues, such as wisdom, benevolence, propriety, 
and righteousness (Ivanhoe 2002; Jiyuan 2006; Van Norden 2007; Mengzi 2008; Jiyuan 
2006).13  Some Christian views seek to validate that faith is a virtue (Jeffrey 2017), while 
David Hume describes “[c]elibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, 
silence, solitude” as vices (2006, 258).  Feminist philosophers have grappled with questions 
about how virtue and wisdom would manifest themselves in conditions of oppression and 
injustice (Tessman 2001).  Some philosophers have argued that we should add to the 
traditional catalog some new virtues that describe the ways a wise person would utilize racial 
categories in times of racial injustice (Blum 2007).  Virtue Ethicists also disagree in 
characterizations of particular virtues, for instance whether acting out of anger is ever 
virtuous.14   
This disagreement about the number and nature of the individual character virtues is 
in some cases an implication of different standards for sorting character traits into virtues and 
vices.  Some philosophers have worked to specify Aristotle’s suggestion that the virtues are 
the character traits that are conducive to eudaimonia (flourishing, or living a good human 
life).  Various ways of filling out this claim have been defended, including that the virtues are 
the traits that promote exercising well certain characteristically human rational, social and/or 
sensory capacities (Kraut 2009; Foot 2003), or that they are the traits that promote a list of 
                                                            
13 See Van Norden (2007) for an examination of the similarities and differences between ancient Greek virtue 
ethics and the moral views of ancient Chinese philosophers.   
14 There is an especially interesting contrast between Buddhist views, on the one hand, and Aristotelian views, 
on the other (Vernezze 2008).  See also, for example, Bell (2009), Nussbaum (2016), and Pettigrove (2012). 
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specific goods or ends (Hursthouse 1999, chap. 9).  Martha Nussbaum argues that this last 
strategy can be used to generate a list of virtues that plausibly applies to all people regardless 
of their culture or context (Nussbaum 2008, 2001).   Others argue that the virtues are 
identifiable solely by direct reference to excellent or admirable individuals (Olberding 2008; 
Zagzebski 2010).15  
But, regardless of the catalogue of character virtues they subscribe to, Virtue Ethicists 
often describe practical wisdom as a sort of master virtue that controls and guides the other 
virtues.  Interestingly, both Aristotle and Mengzi16 use helpful archery metaphors to illustrate 
the sense in which wisdom is a master virtue:   
Moreover, there are many ways to be in error – for badness is proper to the indeterminate, as the 
Pythagoreans pictured it, and good to the determinate.  But there is only way to be correct.  That is why 
error is easy and correctness is difficult, since it is easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it.  And so 
for this reason also excels and deficiency are proper to vice, the mean to virtue; ‘for we are noble in 
only one way, but bad in all sorts of ways.’  (NE 1106a30-35)  
Wisdom may be compared to skillfulness.  Sagacity may be compared to strength.  It is like shooting 
an arrow from beyond a hundred paces: its making it there is due to your strength, but its hitting the 
bull’s-eye is not due to your strength.  (Mengzi 5B1.7)  
One thing Aristotle and Mengzi are saying in these passages is that decisions about how to 
conduct oneself admit of various deviations from the ideal, much as shots of an arrow can 
miss the bulls-eye in varying distances and directions.  It is all too easy to use humor, for 
instance, in a way that derails group goals rather than in a way that motivates effective 
collaboration.  Practical wisdom is the understanding of what matters and how to achieve it, 
both in general and in particular situations, that enables us to navigate such choices reliably 
                                                            
15 These are only a few of the options.  For examples of other accounts of how to identify the character traits 
that are virtues, see Adams (2008), Hill (2012), Slote (2001), Swanton (2003), Van Norden (2007).   
16 All quotations from Mengzi are from Mengzi (2008). 
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well by guiding us to live out our commitments in the right ways, much as archery skill 
enables us to harness our strength for a bulls-eye. 
 
Wisdom and the unity of the virtues 
Aristotle argued that wisdom is a master virtue in a stronger sense, and his claim – 
known as “the unity of the virtues” – has been subject to much contemporary analysis and 
discussion.  Aristotle claimed the virtues are unified in the sense that having one virtue 
requires having them all, and having practical wisdom is both necessary and sufficient for 
having all the virtues (NE 1144b30, NE 1145a2).   
The argument for the unity of the virtues claim can be sketched briefly.17  Having one 
virtue requires having them all because acting on the reasons relevant for having one virtue 
requires having a grasp of the reasons relevant to other virtues.  Having the virtue of 
compassion, for instance, requires responding to threats to others’ well-being in the right 
ways, at the right times, and for the right reasons.  And, knowing when a particular response 
to such a threat is really the right one requires knowing when other considerations are not 
relevant.  For instance, responding compassionately in cases where a friend or loved one 
tearfully admits to wronging someone requires a grasp not only of what would promote their 
or others’ well-being but also when promoting their well-being is less relevant than other 
considerations, such as those of respect, honesty, or justice.  Having a full, cross-situational 
grasp of reasons relevant to one virtue thus requires a grasp of the reasons relevant to all the 
others.  Wisdom is this grasp of reasons and its possession differentiates the reasoned 
decisions of the virtuous from, for instance, someone who merely does what they’ve been 
                                                            
17 Prominent contemporary versions of the argument, similar to the one described here, can be found in 
McDowell (1979) and Wolf (2007). 
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taught.  Having wisdom is thus necessary for being fully virtuous.  Wisdom is also sufficient 
for being virtuous because if someone has this robust cross-situational grasp of reasons (with 
its inherent motivational component), then they will reliably do the right thing, at the right 
time, for the reasons.   
 Despite this apparently compelling argument, the unity of the virtues claim seems to 
contradict our common-sense evaluative judgments of people’s character (Wolf 2007, 146).  
We often describe people as, for instance, being brave but lacking compassion, being 
compassionate but lacking self-respect, or being respectful and compassionate but lacking 
temperance.  If these judgments are correct, then people perhaps can have one virtue without 
having all the others and the unity of the virtues thesis is false.   
This puts us in a dilemma: if we reject the unity of the virtues, then it becomes harder 
to accept the attractive claim that wisdom, as a prescriptive ideal, is a single state of 
understanding that guides a virtuous person’s behavior.  If we accept the unity of the virtues, 
then it becomes hard to justify our seemingly warranted common-sense judgments about the 
mixes of virtue and vice we see in people.   
There are various ways we could respond to this problem.   Some philosophers argue 
that we should reject the unity of the virtues and accept what some have called the disunity of 
the virtues (the idea that we can have one virtue without having any of the others) or even 
accept the incompatibility of the virtues (the idea that having certain virtues makes it 
impossible to have certain others) (Badhwar 1996, 307).  These views imply that we need not 
have wisdom to be virtuous (Badhwar 1996, 308).   
Most Virtue Ethicists take a different tack, however, and offer some modified version 
of the unity of the virtues that they think avoids the problems with the traditional version.  
Rosalind Hursthouse argues for a limited unity of the virtues, according to which “anyone 
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who possessed one virtue will have all the others to some degree, albeit, in some cases, a 
pretty limited one” (1999, 156).  This version of the claim limits the degree to which you 
have to have other virtues if you have one.  On this view, for instance, you need not fully 
grasp how to respond to threats to others’ well-being to have the virtue of honesty, but you 
can’t be totally blind to those considerations, either.   
Another way to modify the claim is to argue that the virtues are unified in localized 
domains of a person’s life (home, work, family, friends, etc.) but not in the global sense that 
covers all situations the agent might face.  Neera Badhwar uses the example of a wise 
statesman who “has a deep understanding of people in general, and of the political and 
cultural needs of a nation” but who “lacks experience with children” (1996, 315).  Such a 
person may be a wise statesman but not a wise caretaker, because his actions and emotional 
reactions towards children will often fall short of being, for instance, compassionate and 
respectful.  The traditional unity of the virtues claim implies this sort of person lacks wisdom, 
but Badhwar argues it would be more plausible to say that “a person may be wise and 
virtuous in some domains without being wise or virtuous in all (where not being wise and 
virtuous, it is important to remember, does not mean being foolish and vicious)” (1996, 315).  
To have compassion in the domain of collegial interactions, you need to have all the other 
virtues with respect to that domain but you need not have those virtues with respect to other 
domains (such as in interactions with family and friends).   
Instead of limiting the degree to which one virtue requires the others or limiting the 
unity requirement to particular domains of life, Susan Wolf argues that “in order for a person 
to possess one virtue perfectly and completely, she must possess the knowledge – holistic 
knowledge of what matters – that is necessary for them all” (2007, 163).  According to this 
view, having one virtue fully requires having the knowledge relevant to all the other virtues 
but not necessarily the virtues themselves.  Having the virtue of compassion, for instance, 
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requires having a grasp of when threats to others’ well-being matter and what ought to be 
done about them, which implies that they also have the knowledge relevant to the other 
virtues.  For instance, they also know when considerations of others’ well-being justify 
parting with one’s money to help them (2007, 162).  But, having that knowledge does not 
imply that the person will have the disposition to part with their money in the way they know 
they should:  without this disposition, the person lacks the virtue of generosity, even though 
they have the knowledge relevant to it.   
Deciding whether and how the virtues are unified is important not only because of its 
implications for our judgments about ourselves and others but also because it affects the 
prospects for studying wisdom empirically.  If there is a disunity of the virtues, then wisdom 
is not necessary for integrating the other virtues.  This does not necessarily imply wisdom is 
unimportant, but it does  imply wisdom is much less special than it may have seemed.  If 
there is a unity of the virtues, then practical wisdom, as a comprehensive and reliable cross-
situational grasp of what to do, will be challenging to infer from the kind of minimal 
behavioral and introspective evidence we usually have about people we interact with (or, in 
the case of psychologists, the people we study).  If there is a limited unity of the virtues, then 
this could influence whether and how wisdom can be operationalized.  Philosophical 
arguments about the unity of the virtues thus have bearing on the psychological study of 
wisdom. 
 
Components of wisdom 
In addition to questions about the nature of wisdom, philosophers have sought to examine the 
components of wisdom: the motivations, habits, dispositions, beliefs, knowledge, or abilities 
that make up wise understanding.  Psychologists who study wisdom have identified a variety 
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of components, including relationship skills and emotional intelligence.  Philosophers have 
focused much of their attention on principles, reasoning, and reflection.   
 What kinds of reasoning and reflection will a wise person employ to determine how to 
conduct herself?  Moral philosophers in general differ on the kind of moral reasoning they 
think is required for moral decision-making, with some arguing that good reasoning requires 
developing and applying moral principles (general moral rules) to particular cases and others 
arguing that attention to the particulars of situations is primary.   
 One particularly influential idea has been that wisdom is, or at least includes, a 
reliable quasi-perceptual capacity to recognize reasons for action (McDowell 2001, 51; 
Nussbaum 1990, 2001, 3:300).  According to this view, a wise person has a reliable 
sensitivity to reasons for action such that, for instance, she correctly sees her colleague’s 
routine and unwarranted exclusion from important decisions as a reason to advocate on his 
behalf.  On John McDowell’s view (1979), this perceptual sensitivity has both a cognitive 
and a motivational aspect: it represents the action as something to be done for a reason (even 
if it’s merely that it’s kind or respectful) and this representation motivates action.  In addition, 
this perceptual capacity “silences” other competing alternatives: when confronted with a 
family member’s racist joke, for instance, staying silent is not even perceived as an option.  
Julia Peters argues that this idea that virtue is a sensitivity to reasons that silences competing 
alternatives helps to capture important points about wisdom.  Among other things, it helps fill 
out Aristotle’s distinction between being fully virtuous (someone who reliably does the right 
thing for the right reasons without having to struggle against temptations to do otherwise) and 
merely continent (someone who does the right thing for the right reasons but only after 
struggling against a temptation to do otherwise) (2013, 72).  
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 Another particularly influential idea, originally suggested by Aristotle and defended 
by contemporary philosophers like John McDowell and Rosalind Hursthouse, is that a wise 
person’s understanding is uncodifiable: it is not possible to come up with a set of moral 
principles that a non-virtuous person could use to derive good guidance in any particular 
situation (Hursthouse 1999, 39–40).18  Morality is too complex, Virtue Ethicists argue, to 
capture with such a set of principles.   
 For instance, someone might try to defend the following moral principle: An action is 
right when, of all the actions possible in a situation, it could be expected to produce the most 
total long-term happiness when the effects on everyone are added up.19  If this principle 
accurately described what matters in all situations, then a non-virtuous person could use it to 
derive (after suitable inquiry into the likely consequences of different actions) reliable 
guidance about what to do.   
 Virtue Ethicists argue that principles like this do not succeed in codifying wise 
understanding.  One argument for this conclusion is that all such sets of principles seem to 
fail the tests moral philosophers put them to: in at least some cases, they provide guidance 
that we judge to be deficient when we’re thinking clearly.  As Hursthouse puts it, there is an 
“increasing sense that the enterprise of coming up with such a set of rules or principles has 
failed” (1999, 40).   
 Julia Annas provides additional arguments against codifiability.  Annas (2004) argues 
that calls for the codifiability of wise understanding assume the “computer manual model” of 
moral theories.  According to the computer manual model of a theory of right action, a theory 
of right action is supposed to do the work of figuring out what to do in a particular situation 
                                                            
18 In some of Plato’s dialogues (e.g. Hippias Major), Socrates appears to be searching for a definition of virtue 
that could do this.  
19 This is a very simplistic version of a moral theory known as Act-Utilitarianism.  For more sophisticated 
versions of Utilitarianism, see for example Hooker (2000), Railton (1988, 1984), Singer (2011). 
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for us by having answers for what to do and why given some description of the situation.  
Annas makes a number of arguments against the computer manual model: It would 
implausibly imply that it is possible for a clever teenager who lacks life experience and hasn’t 
engaged in any useful reflection on what matters to use the theory to reliably do the right 
thing, and that it would be possible for a vicious advisor to use it to give us reliably good 
guidance. 
 If Virtue Ethicists are correct that wise understanding is uncodifiable, then that would 
imply that a reliable understanding of how to conduct oneself must be acquired through some 
sort of experience and reflection.20   
But what kind of reflection?  Part of developing full virtue is being brought up to care 
about the right things, such as honesty, justice, kindness, self-respect, and so on.  But fully 
developing virtue requires developing practical wisdom, which requires experience and 
reflection that further hones and specifies a person’s grasp of what matters.  For example, 
children may have an innate concern for others (they have feelings of compassion).  But this 
is not sufficient for the virtue of compassion, because children are still prone to show concern 
at the wrong times, in the wrong ways, and for the wrong reasons.  Reflection is required to 
develop these feelings of concern into a disposition to respond (in our thoughts, feelings, 
motivations, and actions) to threats to others’ well-being in the right ways, at the right times, 
and for the right reasons.  Aristotle thought we need reflection that focuses both on the 
universal and the on the particulars of situations (NE 1141b10-15, 1142a14).   
A wise person needs to reflect on the particular in the sense that they need to specify 
which of the particular details of a situation matter and what this implies about how we ought 
                                                            
20 For additional detailed and influential arguments that wise understanding is not codifiable, see the work of 
Martha Nussbaum (e.g Nussbaum 1990).  Feminist philosophers have also argued that understanding how one 
ought to act requires attention to the particulars rather than merely application of abstract principles. 
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to conduct ourselves in that situation.  Although Aristotle appears to claim that wise 
reflection doesn’t deliberate about the ends of our actions but simply the means to them, 
many philosophers think this claim is best interpreted to allow for reflection that specifies our 
ends (Richardson 1990): to develop wisdom, we may not need to deliberate about whether 
kindness is important but we do need to deliberate to specify what kindness requires in this 
situation or that.   
Virtue Ethical views inspired by ancient Chinese philosophers describe a reasoning 
process through which attention to particulars can build a person’s understanding of what 
matters.  Mencius describes virtue development as the process of “extending” the “sprouts” 
of the virtues.  We develop compassion, for instance, by engaging in reflection that extends 
our care for others in the right ways in the right situations (Ivanhoe 2002).  David Wong 
argues that analogical reasoning (evaluating a challenging situation or action by determining 
if it is relevantly similar to another one we have a better grasp of) is one way this extension 
could take place (2002).21  This mode of argument is also often applied in contemporary 
applied ethics, which is the part of moral philosophy that evaluates arguments about 
particular moral issues.22  For instance, to decide whether you ought to text while driving, it 
might help to consider whether there is any relevant difference between doing that and 
driving drunk (Swartwood 2017).  Or, to determine whether you ought to vote for a candidate 
who rejects anti-discrimination laws protecting LGBTQ people, you could reflect on whether 
there is any relevant difference between those laws and laws prohibiting racial or religious 
discrimination (Corvino, Anderson, and Girgis 2017, 99–102, 247–51).  By examining and 
reflecting on a variety of different analogies, a person can hone their understanding of what 
                                                            
21 For a demonstration, written for a non-philosophical audience, of how to analyze and evaluate moral 
arguments from analogy, see Swartwood (2017).  For an argument that even fanciful (invented or 
hypothetical) examples can be a useful part of this kind of reasoning, see Stoner and Swartwood (2017).   
22 For just a few of the many interesting moral arguments from analogy discussed by professional 
philosophers, see Norcross (2004) and Thomson (1971).   
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matters and also work towards ensuring that their judgments about particular cases are 
justified and consistent with one another. 
 In addition to reflection on the particulars, Aristotle also claimed that developing 
wisdom requires reflection on the universal.  One way to interpret this claim is as 
recommending a grasp of general rules or principles describing what matters.  While many 
Virtue Ethicists agree that developing wisdom thus requires reflection, they disagree about 
the extent to which wisdom requires having a consciously accessible grasp of moral 
principles and whether and how this grasp is applied in deliberation.  On one view (known as 
particularism), what is primary is attention to particulars of situations (Dancy 2001), while 
other views emphasize the necessity of grasping at least some general moral principles 
(though not ones that codify wise understanding).   
 A related dispute regards whether a wise person would have a consciously accessible 
and comprehensive (but not necessarily codifiable) picture (or “blueprint”) of a good life.  
This blueprint could take different forms: a description of a person of ideal character, a set of 
weighted general principles describing the conduct that comprises a good life (Russell 2009, 
27), or a general description of the values constitutive of a good life and how they fit together 
(Tiberius 2008, 65).  Following Daniel Russell (2009, 27–30, n. 46), we can distinguish 
between two types of blueprint views: views that see the blueprint being directly applied in 
decision-making and views that assign the blueprint a more indirect role.   
According to what we could call Direct Blueprint Views, a wise person deliberates 
about what to do in particular situations by applying her consciously accessible blueprint.  By 
imagining how an idealized virtuous person would handle the situation, or by specifying the 
implications of weighted principles governing a good life, she can decide how to respond 
when (for instance) a senior colleague makes a sexist joke at a conference.  Various 
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objections have been leveled at the Direct Blueprint View: Daniel Russell argues, for 
instance, that it ascribes to the wise a totally unfamiliar type of practical reasoning, its 
depiction of deliberation is mysterious, and it implies an overly intellectual and elitist view of 
wisdom (2009, 27–9; see also Broadie 1993, chap. 4).   
According to another view, which we could call the Indirect Blueprint View, a wise 
person has a blueprint that indirectly improves her decisions about particular situations by 
helping her see what matters most in a particular situation.  According to Valerie Tiberius 
(2008), for instance, a wise person has a conception of a good life that locates her various 
values and how they are related with respect to mutual support and relative priority.  This 
conception of a good life must have some structure, but it need not have a particular structure 
such as that of a detailed plan, and it must be flexible enough to allow the person to learn 
from experience.  A wise person’s conception of a good life is not the kind of blueprint that 
could be used to deduce what to do in a particular context.  Rather, it is a rough map of values 
that guides the shifts in our attention from one value to another, depending on the particular 
situation.  The Indirect Blueprint View is supposed to avoid the problems of the Direct View 
while accounting for the complexity and coherence of a wise person’s understanding 
(Tiberius 2008, 65; Kristjánsson 2015, 100) and explaining how developing wisdom enables 
a person to distinguish plausible conceptions of the good life from seemingly-attractive 
imposters (Kraut 1993, 374).   
 In addition to reasoning and reflection skills, many philosophers emphasize the 
essential role of emotions and other traits or dispositions in wise understanding.  For instance, 
Martha Nussbaum (1990) and Karen Stohr (2006) argue that moral imagination and empathy 
are important components of wise understanding that enable us to deal with the complexities 
of social interactions.  Valerie Tiberius (2008) in her discussion of what she calls reflective 
wisdom – the kind of wisdom required to live a good life from one’s own point of view – 
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argues that this kind of wisdom requires various habits and dispositions that allow us to 
recognize and respond appropriately to our values.  Reflective wisdom comprises enough 
self-awareness to know what matters to us and what our obstacles are to obtaining it, the 
ability to conform our emotional reactions and motivations to this knowledge of what 
matters, and the ability to shift our attention among our various values depending on the 
context. 
 
Skill analogies 
The task of developing wisdom has struck some as similar to the task of developing 
more ordinary practical skills.  This has led some philosophers to pursue an analogy that 
occupied the ancients: if we could show that wisdom is similar in relevant ways to certain 
practical skills (Aristotle and Plato considered examples like medicine or ship-building), then 
we could learn about wisdom by looking at the more readily available direct evidence about 
the nature and development of those skills.   
These skill analogies promise to illuminate contentious concepts like wisdom and 
virtue by drawing comparisons between them and more ordinary and better-understood skills.  
The point is not to claim that virtue is identical to these other skills but instead that it is 
similar in relevant and revealing ways.  Interestingly, some of the competing contemporary 
versions of this analogy imply significantly different pictures of the nature and components 
of virtue.   
 Julia Annas (1995, 2011) has made a sustained defense of a version of the skill 
analogy inspired by Plato.  Annas argues that virtue is analogous to tennis, piano playing, and 
other practical skills distinguished by “the need to learn and the drive to aspire” (2011, 25).  
These skills are developed first by engaging in practice with feedback from experts and then 
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by undertaking continued intelligent and self-guided reflection aimed at grasping the 
principles governing successful performance (2011, 20, 25).  By arguing that virtue is 
relevantly similar, Annas develops a picture of virtue as a comprehensive and articulate grasp 
of principles of good conduct acquired through motivated and intelligent conscious reflection.   
 Matthew Stichter argues (2007, 2011, 2015), contra Annas, that an analogy to 
practical skills vindicates a less intellectual picture of virtue.  His view, which is inspired by 
Aristotle, draws upon accounts of expertise according to which skills in areas like driving are 
acquired primarily through experience rather than reflection on principles, and expert 
decision making is driven by intuition (immediate, affect-laden, relatively effortless 
judgments made without conscious reasoning) rather than consciously applied reasoning 
(2007, 192).23  While Stichter does not think that wisdom is a skill (2016, 215), he does think 
we can learn much about the nature of character virtues by examining how they compare to 
practical skills.   
 The skill analogy promises to illuminate the nature of virtue (and by extension, at 
least in Annas’s case, the nature of wisdom).  But this promise remains unfulfilled as long as 
we are unable to choose between competing versions of the analogy that generate 
significantly different results.  To make good on the skill analogy we need philosophical 
argument that establishes that virtue and/or wisdom is similar in the relevant ways to some 
type of more ordinary skill, and we need reliable empirical evidence about the nature and 
development of that type of skill.   
Jason Swartwood (2013b, 2013a) has defended a version of the analogy that he argues 
tells us important things about wisdom while also resolving the conflict between Annas and 
Stichter.  According to this expert skill model of wisdom, wisdom is the same type of 
                                                            
23 Stichter (2007) focuses on the work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1991) and Dreyfus (1997).   
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understanding constitutive of expert decision-making skills in areas like firefighting, 
teaching, and tactical decision-making.  By developing the analogy in a way that isolates a 
specific set of skills that have been subject to up-to-date empirical research, Swartwood 
argues we can work towards a philosophically sensible, empirically plausible, and practically 
useful defense of a skill analogy.   
As with all skill analogies, Swartwood’s argument for the expert skill model of 
wisdom has two main components: a philosophical argument for the conclusion that wisdom 
is the same kind of understanding as certain types of expert decision-making skills, and an 
analysis of the empirical literature on the nature of those skills.   
The philosophical argument starts by identifying the kind of achievement wisdom is.   
Wise people understand how to conduct themselves, all-things-considered: they are able to 
make decisions that appropriately express their commitments to justice, self-respect, honesty, 
and the like, even in situations that would befuddle the rest of us.  The domain of all-things-
considered decisions is a domain of complex choice and challenging performance:  the 
challenge is not only that the factors that make for a good choice are many, varied, and 
interact in complex ways; we also need to coordinate our motivation and affect so that we end 
up actually doing the right thing for the right reasons.  The next step of the argument is to 
argue that wisdom is relevantly similar to expert decision-making skill in areas like 
firefighting, military tactics, teaching (etc.), because both wisdom and those skills involve an 
understanding of how to conduct oneself in a domain of complex choice and challenging 
performance.  The point is not that wisdom is identical to expert decision-making skill in 
those areas or that expert decision-makers in those areas are wise (many experts are not!).  
Instead, as with all skill analogies, the point is that wise understanding is similar to expert 
decision-making skill in those areas in ways that are relevant to determining what wisdom is 
like in real people and how they can develop it.   
35 
 
The next step in the argument is to provide an account of the nature of expert 
decision-making skills in the relevant areas.  According to Swartwood (2013b, 517–20), 
prominent psychological research on naturalized decision-making reveals that expert 
decision-making skill in areas of complex choice and challenging performance can be 
analyzed into a number of component abilities:24 
• Intuitive ability: an expert is often able to identify what she ought to do quickly, effortlessly, 
and without conscious deliberation. 
• Deliberative ability: an expert is able to use slow, effortful, consciously accessible processes 
to search for and evaluate what she ought to do when an intuitive identification is lacking or 
inadequate. 
• Meta-cognitive ability: an expert is able to identify when and how to rely on intuition and 
deliberation. 
• Self-regulative ability: an expert is able to identify how to affect her environment, behavior, 
affect, and motivations so that she can successfully do what she has identified she ought to do. 
• Self-cultivation ability: an expert is able to identify how to tailor her practice and experience 
in order to make her intuitive, deliberative, and self-regulative abilities even more reliable 
over the long-run. 
This analysis of the empirical literature then generates analogous conclusions about 
wisdom if the philosophical argument is sound: It implies, for instance, that wise people will 
likely use a combination of conscious reflection (of the kind described in the previous section 
of this paper) and intuition to make decisions (2013b, 523–24).25  Thus, if Swartwood’s 
                                                            
24 Swartwood relies especially on the work of Daniel Kahneman (2011), and Gary Klein (1997, 2007, 2008, 
2009; Kahneman and Klein 2009), and others working on dual processing models of decision-making and 
naturalized decision-making research (e.g. Ericsson and Lehmann 1996; Ericsson et al. 2006; Ericsson 2008; 
Feltovich, Prietula, and Ericsson 2006).  Research on tacit knowledge may also be relevant.  See, e.g., Cianciolo 
et al (2006; 2006), Sternberg and Horvath (1999). 
25 It’s important to note that the skill analogies are not claiming that wise people get feedback on their 
decisions in exactly the same way as, for instance, firefighters do.  The research on expert decision-making 
indicates that experts develop their reliable intuition by feedback on the regularities governing their area of 
expertise (Kahneman and Klein 2009).  For a firefighter (for instance), this can come in the form of seeing 
whether what was expected to happen actually happened (did that fire cave the roof in?) or from reflection on 
whether the outcome best achieved the goals of firefighting.  For wisdom (and even a lot of other practical 
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argument is a good one, it resolves the disagreement between Annas and Stichter about the 
roles of intuition and reflection in wisdom.   
By drawing connections between wisdom and better understood skills, skill analogies 
like those defended by Annas, Stichter and Swartwood promise to give us philosophically 
sensible and empirically plausible answers to questions about the nature and development of 
wisdom, including the nature of wise deliberation or the extent to which a wise person has a 
consciously accessible blueprint of a good life.   
Determining whether any of these skill analogies succeeds requires determining both 
whether wisdom or virtue is relevantly similar to the specific skills (or types of skills) 
identified and whether the empirical evidence actually shows that those skills have the 
features they’re claimed to have.  Various objections have been raised to skill analogies in 
general and to specific versions of the analogy, and many focus on trying to identify a 
relevant difference between the identified skills and wisdom.26 
One important objection to skill analogies in general concerns the role of motivation 
in virtues like wisdom: some argue that wisdom is not a decision-making skill because, 
unlike skills, a person cannot have it but fail to act on it (Kekes 1995, 30; Stalnaker 2010, 
408; Mengzi 2008, xxxiii; Zagzebski 1996).  If a firefighter prefers to let a building burn 
rather than applying her understanding to stop it, or if a piano player refuses ever to play 
again, that need not imply they lack expert skill.  On the other hand, someone who had no 
                                                            
skills – see Klein (2009)), mere observation is insufficient to provide feedback, because part of making wise 
decisions is determining what features of a situation matter: is it the consequences (if so, which ones?), the 
nature of the action, or what?  Feedback on our understanding of what matters will have to come in part from 
the sort of reflection discussed earlier in this section.  That kind of reflection, done well, would help hone the 
wise person’s intuitive abilities while also providing a conscious grasp of some important principles she can use 
in reflection on tough or novel cases.  The point is that while defenders of skill analogies need to claim that 
both the wise and experts get feedback through experience and reflection they need not claim that the 
feedback is acquired in exactly the same way. 
26 For discussion of objections of this kind, see, for example, Annas (2003, chap. 3), Jacobson (2005), and 
Swartwood (2013b, 524–26, 2013a, chap. 4). 
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desire to do what she rightly saw as kind (respectful, etc.) would to that degree lack wisdom.   
This seems to imply that wisdom requires a motivational component that skills lack.   
There are several ways a defender of a skill analogy might reply to this objection 
(Swartwood 2013b, 525–26).  She might admit that we need to add a motivational component 
to fully describe wisdom but deny that this undermines the analogy.  Even if we need to add a 
motivational component, perhaps the analogy still shows, for instance, that wisdom includes 
the five decision-making skills described by Swartwood or is developed through the kind of 
reflection described by Annas.  Alternatively, she could argue that the objection fails to 
identify a difference between wisdom and expert decision-making skills, because those 
decision-making skills similarly require motivating affective responses that have been shaped 
through experience and reflection. 
Recently, additional objections have been raised to Swartwood’s version of the skill 
analogy that might also bear on some of the others.  Kristján Kristjánsson argues that, unlike 
expert decision-making skills, wisdom requires grappling with “existential questions” such as 
whether a particular job, occupation, relationship or project is really conducive to a good life 
(2015, 98, 101).  In a similar vein, Matthew Stichter argues that, unlike wisdom, expert 
decision-making skills do not “involve making value judgments about the worth of the end 
being pursued” (2016, 211; Hacker-Wright 2015, 986). If this is an actual difference between 
the two types of understanding, then we could reasonably expect wisdom to require 
significantly different reasoning and reflection capacities.  And, if we avoid implausibly 
relativistic views of the nature of wisdom (like Simple Cultural Relativism), we’ll have to 
admit that wisdom requires critically scrutinizing the value of the ends and goals one inherits 
from their culture, community, and family.   
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The most plausible route for defending the expert skill model against this objection, 
then, is to argue that reflection on the value of ends is part of expert decision-making skill in 
at least some domains.  This may well hold true of some expert decision-making skills but 
not others: critically reflecting on the value of grading or discussion practices may be 
necessary for expertise in teaching, for instance, even if similar critical scrutiny is not 
required for expertise in some other areas.  By examining whether wisdom is relevantly 
similar to any expert decision-making skills in this way, we can determine whether we need 
to further specify the expert skill model or whether (having learned something important 
about wisdom) we should reject it.   
This brief overview reveals why skill analogies offer one possible framework for the 
interdisciplinary study of wisdom: they offer the possibility of an empirically tractable and 
philosophically sound account of what wisdom is and how it can be developed by real people.  
Importantly, determining whether any versions of the analogy succeed is an interdisciplinary 
task. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF WISDOM 
In her discussion of the unity of the virtues, philosopher Susan Wolf concludes: 
Our philosophical positions are refined and improved by subjecting them to the demand that they be 
reconciled with the observations of ordinary life as well as social science, and our descriptions and 
interpretations of daily life and empirical studies are refined and improved by requiring them to 
consider the challenges that come from ethical and other philosophical argument.  (2007, 167) 
By reviewing philosophical work on wisdom we’ve seen that the same point applies to 
wisdom.  Accounts of wisdom simultaneously prescribe ways of being and also make 
assumptions about what humans beings are like.  Providing a plausible account of what 
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wisdom is and how we can develop it thus requires applying the tools both of philosophy and 
empirical psychology.  Wolf is clearly correct that “[t]here is not, at this point at least, a 
formula for how to work in this interdisciplinary area” (2007, 166).27  But, what is equally 
clear is that we are not without a variety of promising answers to questions about the nature 
of wisdom and interdisciplinary frameworks for exploring them.   
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